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A System Dynamics Model
Financial crises are becoming more frequent events in the world economy.  The broad-based
move to increased capital market liberalization over the past few decades has not only contributed to
the fragility exhibited, but also managed to make contagion more likely.  The need to understand the
logic of financial panics is greater than ever.
Though elements of his work have been incorporated into other’s analyses (most notably,
Minsky), we still see little reference to Keynes’ full-scale trade cycle model in modern crisis theory. 
Indeed, his attempt to describe an economy in time in Chapter 22 of the General Theory, an effort
that he claimed required “every element in our analysis...for its complete explanation” (Keynes 1964,
p.313), has received comparatively little attention (Carlson and Keller 1982).  This state of affairs is
disappointing because what he presents there is a comprehensive, useful, and unique explanation of
economic fluctuations.  It would serve as an excellent framework into which many of the newer ideas
could be placed.
The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the usefulness of Keynes’ approach by modeling it
using system dynamics.  As this technique allows the researcher to place the analysis in time it is
especially well suited to the task.  It also allows us to see exactly which elements seem to create the
characteristic shape of the business cycle and crisis.
Keynes’ Chapter Twenty Two and Crisis Theory
Keynes identifies five factors responsible for the trade cycle (Keynes 1964, pp.313-320):
1. the negative impact of the rising stock of capital on the marginal efficiency of capital (mec);2
Figure 1: Keynes’ Basic Model.
2. the tendency of the rate of interest to rise over the expansion as the demand for financing begins
to place pressure on supply;
3. the continuing upward pressure on the rate of interest once the collapse has begun (and agents
scramble for liquidity);
4. the fall in the marginal propensity to consume (mpc) that will accompany the decline in the
values of portfolios (assuming the bust brings with it a fall in asset values);
5. the manner in which agents form expectations of the future.
Of these, 3 and 4 make themselves felt once the turning point has been reached and the
economy is in recession.  1 and 2 cause the expansion to tend to lose strength as it matures.  But, as we
shall see, it is 5 that gives the cycle its characteristic shape.  Without it, the economy tends toward a
situation in which investment reaches a stable
equilibrium (where gross capital formation just
offsets deprecation).
To better illustrate this, Keynes’
model will be built in piecemeal fashion,
beginning with the rather straightforward
relationships shown in Figure 1.  Eliminating
the government and foreign sectors for
simplicity, GDP is a positive function of
investment and consumption (assuming a
simple multiplier process).  Investment in turn3
Figure 2: Keynes’ Basic Model in Powersim.
is driven by the mec and the rate of interest.  The determinants of the mec are limited to the stock of
capital to highlight the latter’s impact in creating the trade cycle.  As the stock of capital rises with net
increases in investment, so the expectation of profit from future additions to the stock of capital will
decline.  Hence, a rise in investment inevitably (though not immediately) creates a fall as the economy
works through the negative feedback loop show at the top of Figure 1:
[investment Y  [stock of capital Y  \mec Y \investment.
The falling mec, rather than the rising interest rate as suggested in 2 creates the underlying dynamic and
is, according to Keynes, the more “typical, and often the predominant” reason for collapse (Keynes
1964, p.315).  Alone, however, it is no guarantee of a business cycle.  This is illustrated below.
Using the equations listed
in the Appendix, this simple
system was modeled in
Powersim.  Figure 2 shows the
schematic.  Note that the
negative feedback loop
mentioned above still appears. 
Also note the addition of two
new variables: Depreciation and
Target Stock of Capital.  The
former is simply the rate at which
existing capital decays, while the4
Figure 3: Linear Specification of mec.
latter is included on the assumption that the mec is a function of how much the existing stock of capital
differs from some objectively-determined target level that would presumably satisfy current demand.
Running this simulation shows that it does not create a cycle.  Though it creates an underlying
logic for the appearance of a turning point,
by itself the economy represented by
Figure 2 may actually yield a stable
equilibrium.  The key is the specification of
the mec.  If we give mec as a simple linear
function, as in equation (5) in the
Appendix, then the economy seeks a point
where net investment will exactly offset
depreciation.  This occurs in Figure 3, where mec fell as the gap between the target and actual stock of
capital was filled, but then settled off as net investment came to rest at zero (which in this model occurs
when mec exceeds interest by five percentage).  For sake of brevity, plots of investment and GDP are
not shown; but as the former is a function of the difference between the mec and the rate of interest and
the latter varies directly with the former their patterns can be easily inferred.
A cycle can be created using the simple model, but it requires resorting to a convenient and not
necessarily intuitive, respecification of the mec.  Equation (5'), for example, shows mec equal to the
square root of the difference between the actual and target stock of capital.  This yields the pattern
shown in Figure 4, which is much more like that we would expect.  That we have no a priori reason to
prefer (5') to (5), however, is a weakness of this approach.5
Figure 4: Nonlinear Specification of mec.
Figure 5: Linear Specification of mec, Endogenous
mpc.
As space does not permit a
demonstration of every other
permutation of Keynes’ five elements in
a system dynamics format, I will now
proceed by adding the others
individually to the basic model shown in
Figure 2 so that their contribution can
be highlighted (with a complete model presented at the end).  
Figure 5 shows Keynes simple
model (with a linear specification of mec),
including the impact of a fluctuating mpc
and income multiplier (4 from the above
list).  The two were modeled using
equation (6) from the Appendix, where
the multiplier (which had previously been
exogenously determined as “two”) is
expressed as an inverse function the mec
(as a falling mec would tend to depress asset values; note also that making mpc endogenous required a
slight respecification of equation (1), which now becomes (1')).  As the only real difference between
this economy and the one modeled in Figure 3 is in terms size of the multiplier effect on GDP, we see
no difference in the plot of the mec and the rate of interest.  Just as in Figure 3, the economy comes to6
Figure 6: Keynes’ Basic Model plus Liquidity Preference in
Powersim.
rest at the point where net investment is zero.
Modeling the interest rate endogenously (i.e., using both 2 and 3 from the above list) was
slightly more complicated, but
gave the same essential result. 
To begin, making the interest
rate a function of both demand
for cash for finance purposes
and as a hoard meant linking it
to mec (which impacts
negatively on the rate of interest,
as falling mec implies sinking
optimism and a flight to cash)
and GDP (where rising GDP
raises interest rates).  In terms
of modeling the latter link caused a problem since the current rate of interest could not, in this sort of
system, be simultaneously a function and a determinant of (through investment) GDP.  This is an
economy in time where there must exist a sequence of events.  However, this was solved as shown in
Figure 6.  Here, today’s investment is a result of yesterday’s mec and rate of interest, which implies that
firms made profit projections and secured funding one period ahead of actual spending.  Hence the
delayed link between planned investment and investment.7
Figure 7: Linear Specification of mec, Liquidity
Preference.
All this made little difference in
the end, as interest rates and the mec
once again came to rest at a point where
the latter was 5 percentage points above
the former (this is shown in Figure 7). 
The only difference is that now the rate
of interest is not set exogenously at 5%,
but is determined by GDP and mec (and
in this case reaches equilibrium at 3.69%).  Still, no cycle is generated when the specification of mec is
linear.
It is only when the particular way expectations are formed is taken into account that we see a
real trade cycle.  Agents in Keynes’ General Theory form their forecasts in an environment of
uncertainty.  This leads those forecasts to be a) held with little confidence and b) based largely on the
agent’s impressions of what others believe the market will do (reliance on conventional wisdom in the
face of individual ignorance).  But agents are also inherently optimistic, and it is this optimism, combined
with investors being too busy forecasting market sentiment (which would of late been bullish) and not
industry conditions, that leads to them to continue to expect positive returns well beyond the point that
the increasing size of the stock of capital and rising costs of production would suggest.  Once reality
sets in (as realized profits are compared with prior projections), the flimsy foundation of the
expectations means that the re-evaluation is “sudden and even catastrophic” (Keynes 1964, p.316).
To model this, the useful dichotomy employed by Keller and Carlson (1982) was adopted. 8
Figure 8: Linear Specification of mec, Expectations
Modeled.
There, they distinguish between an objective mec, which “reflects a yield based on a fundamental rate
of return,” and a speculative mec, or one derivative of “individual businessmen’s calculation of yields
which reflect predictions of majority opinion in the marketplace” (Keller and Carlson 1982, p.406).  In
the system dynamics model, the old linear specification of mec was used for the objective mec, while
the speculative one required a series of new equations.  Modeling expectations necessitated the
following adjustments:
i. investment is affected by the speculative mec and not mec;
ii. a bandwagon effect occurs such that consecutive positive values for objective mec contribute a
“bonus” to speculative mec–these accumulate up to the point of crisis;
iii. a similar, though less powerful, bandwagon works in reverse (such that depressed expectations
beget depressed expectations);
iv. a crisis in expectations occurs whenever there are three consecutive periods during which the
speculative mec exceeds the objective one–at that point there is a collapse in the speculative
mec.
Finally, a trade cycle is
created, as shown in Figure 8 (note
that this model leaves the multiplier
and interest as exogenous and adds
only expectations to the basic model). 
Just as one would expect, the fall is
much steeper than the climb and the9
Figure 9: Linear Specification of mec, Expectations
Modeled, Liquidity Preference, and Endogenous mpc.
speculative mec shows much more
volatility than the objective. 
Furthermore, Keynes argument that
over-investment in a strict sense is not
the cause of the cycle is supported since
the objective mec never falls below the
artificial floor created by the rate of
interest, and certainly not below zero.
The picture is even clearer in Figure 9 which, at last, gives the complete model, with
expectations modeled and interest and the mpc/multiplier treated as endogenous (interest, incidentally,
is now linked to the speculative mec and not the objective one).  The story is basically the same as that
shown in Figure 8, but with interest fluctuating in a manner that makes economic recovery even more
difficult.  Figure 10 shows the complete model.10
Figure 10: Complete Model in Powersim.
Conclusions
By placing Keynes’ Chapter Twenty Two into a system dynamics framework it can be
demonstrated that he offered a viable explanation of crisis over half a century ago.  It also becomes
clear that key to panic and collapse is the means by which agents form expectations, with other factors
adding vital elements (including especially the fluctuating objective mec).  His Chapter Twenty Two
offers an excellent base for more complex theories of cycle and crisis.11
APPENDIX
Specification of the Simple Keynes-Style Trade Cycle
This model consisted of five equations, four constants, and an initialization value.
Equations:
(1) GDP = 2*(Investment + Autonomous Consumption)
(2) Investment = 100*(marginal efficiency of capital - interest rate)
(3) Net Investment = Investment - Depreciation
(4) Stock of Capital = Previous Stock of Capital + Net Investment
(5) marginal efficiency of capital = ((Target Stock of Capital - Stock of Capital)/Stock of
Capital)*100
(5') marginal efficiency of capital = (Target Stock of Capital - Stock of Capital)0.5
Constants:
Autonomous Consumption = 2250;
Depreciation = 500;
interest rate = 5;
Target Stock of Capital = 30000;
Stock of Capital initial value = 25000.
In addition, Investment was limited so that it could vary only from 100 to 1600.
Adding Marginal Propensity to Consume/Multiplier
(6) multiplier = 1.8 + mec/3512
(1') GDP = multiplier*(Investment + Autonomous Consumption)
Adding Liquidity Preference
(7) rate of interest = 2 + GDP/1200 - mec/3
Note that making the rate of interest endogenous requires lagging investment.
Adding Expectations
Space does not permit an explanation of this aspect of the model beyond what is offered in the text. 
However, the author is happy to forward a copy of the model and its component equations to
interested readers.13
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